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INNOCENCE LOST IN THE WAKE OF GREEN:
THE TREND IS CLEAR- IF YOU ARE OLD
ENOUGH TO DO THE CRIME, THEN YOU ARE
OLD ENOUGH TO DO THE TIME
Matthew Thomas Wagman'
Illinois implemented the first juvenile justice system in 1899 and now
every state and territory of the United States has a separate court system
for adjudicating juveniles.2 From the beginning, the procedural rights af-
forded in the adult criminal justice system differed from those in the ju-
venile justice system.3 Early promulgators of a separate entity for juve-
niles designed the juvenile justice system to promote rehabilitation and
*J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Caro-
lina Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 3, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C.
1998) (No. 519A96) (providing a brief history of the juvenile justice system and explaining
its purposes); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967) (noting that a concern of the
promulgators of the juvenile justice system included the possibility of children assimilating
with serious adult offenders); Deborah L. Mills, Note, United States v. Johnson: Acknowl-
edging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System From Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 903,905-06 (1996).
2. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14; Mills, supra note 1, at 912 (stating that all jurisdictions
have some method of juvenile transfer to adult criminal court). The most common
method is that of judicial waiver, where the juvenile court judge will base her decision on
the threat the juvenile poses to society and whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilita-
tion. See id. at 912-13. Moreover, studies show that the majority of Americans favor puni-
tive sentences for juveniles because many people in society fear juvenile offenders. See id.
at 932. This fear caused legislatures to shift their goals from rehabilitation to punishment
in an effort to deter juveniles from future criminal behavior. See id. But see Lisa A. Cin-
tron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to
Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1254, 1254 (1996) (explaining how state law-
makers and courts increasingly transfer juveniles out of the juvenile justice system and try
them as adults). The public still supports, however, the traditional goals of the juvenile
justice system: rehabilitation and treatment of youthful offenders. See id. at 1255. Never-
theless, commentators feel that the system of treatment for juveniles is lacking in many
respects. See id. For example, some critics argue that sending juveniles to prison does not
further societal goals in any way because society is essentially giving up on its reformable
criminal offenders. See id. Furthermore, sentencing juveniles as adults only creates a
public perception that the state is curbing the crime problem. See id. at 1255-56. The state
fosters this perception because the majority of juvenile delinquents subject to transfer do
not commit serious crimes, e.g., those against persons, and consequently, society is doing
little to prevent these crimes by transferring juveniles to adult criminal court. See id. at
1256.
3. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
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treatment.4 Conversely, the adult criminal justice system sought retribu-
tion and punishment.5
The early promulgators of a separate system for adjudicating juveniles
sought to avoid the possibility of young offenders sharing prison space
with hardened criminals.6 These reformers felt that society owed a duty
to juveniles to act as parens patriae7 to prevent children from beginning a
"downward career" toward recidivism.' To further meet this preventive
end, the early proponents of the juvenile justice system sought to avoid
labeling juveniles as "criminal," favoring instead the term "delinquent."9
Proponents determined that because juveniles were not criminals, they
did not need to have the same due process rights that the Constitution' °
4. See id. at 15-16. Commentators find that,
[w]ith respect to the delinquent child, the philosophy of juvenile court laws is that
the juvenile is to be considered and treated not as a criminal, but as a person re-
quiring care, education, and protection. A fundamental aim of juvenile court
laws is the prevention of delinquency of children. Consequently, such laws are
not punitive, but are corrective and protective in that their purpose is to make
good citizens of potentially bad ones. In other words, the welfare of the child lies
at the very foundation of the statutory scheme.
47 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children § 1 (1995) (foot-
notes omitted); see also Mills, supra note 1, at 903 (explaining that rehabilitation of juve-
niles was the purpose for creating a separate system for adjudicating juveniles).
5. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. The creators of the juvenile justice system wanted to
rehabilitate and treat juveniles in addition to providing the juveniles with "clinical," as op-
posed to "punitive," procedures for adjudication. See id.; see also 47 AM. JUR. 2D, supra
note 4, at § 5 (stating that a goal of the juvenile justice system is to treat and not punish,
while the sole purpose of criminal law is to punish its offenders).
6. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (explaining that the early reformers of the juvenile jus-
tice system believed that society's role was to educate juveniles to prevent them from be-
coming career criminals).
7. See id. at 16. But see id. at 21-22 (rejecting the notion of parens patriae); Amicus
Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation
in Support of Appellant at 8, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96)
(contending that the Court in Gault rejected the notion of parens patriae because of the
inability of the state to use fair and consistent procedures).
8. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV.
L. REV. 104, 119-20 (1909) (explaining that the juvenile justice system should treat juve-
niles in the system as though the child was under the state's care rather than under arrest).
9. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-24 (noting that unfortunately the term "delinquent" car-
ries with it an almost identical social stigma as the term "criminal"); see also Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) (stating that the juvenile justice system is not
designed to adjudicate criminal conduct; rather, its purpose is to act as parens patriae in
determining the best interests of the child and society); In re Burrus, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-
87 (N.C. 1969) (holding that juveniles who are deemed delinquent are not on par with
adults considered criminal). See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 4, at § 1 (asserting
that the laws of the juvenile court should not be punitive in nature).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
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guarantees criminals." The lack of due process standards in juvenile pro-
ceedings, however, meant juveniles did not receive individualized atten-
tion. 2 Instead, departures from established constitutional procedures
have often produced unfair, inefficient, and arbitrary results rather than
the enlightened adjudication originally sought. 3 Currently, the societal
trend has been to label some juveniles as "criminals" because of the hei-
nous crimes they commit.
1'4
According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1995," juvenile arrests
increased 20% from 1991 to 1995, more than ten times that of adults.6
Juveniles in the age group of thirteen to fourteen years old represented
the highest percent distribution, 4.5%, of all juveniles charged. The sta-
tistics also illustrate that police arrested children between the ages of
thirteen and fourteen for forcible rape with greater frequency than most
other age groups considered juvenile. 8 These statistics made the imple-
mentation of transfer statutes, and the sentencing of juveniles as adults,
more attractive to lawmakers. 9 The number of jurisdictions allowing for
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.") See also id. amend. XIV § 1.
11. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-17; see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 555 (noting that the state
should, in juvenile proceedings, act as parens patriae and not as an adversary). Tradition-
ally, juvenile proceedings have been labeled as civil rather than criminal and therefore the
juvenile cannot claim that he is entitled to the same due process rights as a criminal. See
id.
12. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-20 (concluding that an unfair adjudication may occur
when the state ignores due process rights because due process of law "is the basic and es-
sential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits
the powers which the state may exercise.").
13. See id. at 18-19.
14. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (ruling that the death sentence
awarded to a 17-year-old defendant convicted of murder was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La. 1984) (deciding that giving a life sentence
to a 15-year-old juvenile for committing aggravated rape was not cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); May v. State, 398 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Miss. 1981) (discussing a 14-year-old defen-
dant arrested for armed robbery); see also Mills, supra note 1, at 932 (explaining that juve-
niles today are not only committing more crimes in general, they are also committing more
violent crimes).
15. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 1995 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1996) [here-
inafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995].
16. See id. at 207.
17. See id. at 218 (noting that juveniles age 13 to 14 and those 18 years of age both
accounted for 4.5% of all persons arrested). The next highest age group was 17-year-old
juveniles who accounted for 4.3% of all persons arrested. See id.
18. See id. (stating that the police arrested 82 more 18-year-old juveniles for forcible
rape than 13- to 14-year-old juveniles).
19. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 829 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. __
119 S. Ct. 883 (1999) (explaining that the prevailing public sentiment in North Carolina is
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the transfer of juveniles ages thirteen and below to adult criminal court is
evidence of this trend . Moreover, of the 1,356,108 juveniles arrested in
1995, police referred 3.3% immediately to adult criminal court while they
referred 65.7% to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.2 ' These statistics
leave open the possibility that law enforcement officials could transfer
two-thirds of all juveniles arrested to adult criminal court.
2
In State v. Green,23 the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided two
constitutional issues that arise when courts adjudicate juveniles as
adults.24 First, the court reviewed the constitutionality of North Caro-
lina's transfer statute.25 Second, the court decided whether the imposi-
tion of a mandatory life sentence for a thirteen-year-old convicted rapist
was cruel and/or unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
that juvenile crime has to be dealt with more seriously); see also 47 AM. JUR. 2D, supra
note 4, at § 41. The term "transfer statute" refers to a statute that permits juvenile court
judges to remand a case to adult criminal court for adjudication. See 1 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 98, at 657-64 (15th ed. 1993). Some statutes pro-
vide that juvenile courts may retain jurisdiction or transfer jurisdiction depending on the
amenability of the juvenile. See id. Other statutes automatically bring the juvenile before
the adult criminal court, which then makes the transfer decision. See id. Finally, some
statutes require that the minor request a transfer to juvenile court when brought before
the adult criminal court.. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 4, at § 41.
20. Accord COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518 (1)(a)(I)(A) (1998) (allowing transfer at a
minimum age of 12 for certain felonies and crimes of violence); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
39 (a)(4) (1999) (allowing transfer at a minimum age of 13 for acts punishable by death or
life imprisonment); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (1) (1999) (allowing transfer at a mini-
mum age of 13); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (1) (West 1996) (allowing transfer at a mini-
mum age of 12); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (1)(a) (1997) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 5506(a) (1991) (allowing transfer for sexual assault and several other felonies at age
10); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (1999) (transfer at age 13 or older); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 47.12.100 (Michie 1998) (no minimum age requirement for transferring juveniles
to adult criminal court); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-302 (West 1999) (same); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 937-938 (1974) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 20-508-20-509 (1997) (same); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West 1980) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-261, 43-276
(1998) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24 (1994) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 7303-4.3 (West 1998) (same); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419C.340, 419C.352 (1997) (same);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 14-1-7, 14-1-7.2 (1994) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-11-1, 26-
11-4 (Michie 1999) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (1996) (same).
21. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 15, at 265 (reporting police dis-
position of juvenile offenders taken into custody).
22. See id.
23. 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998).
24. See id. at 823, 831 (upholding the constitutional validity of North Carolina's sys-
tem of transferring juveniles to adult criminal court, as well as sentencing a 13-year-old
juvenile to a mandatory life term).
25. See id. at 826. Recently, the North Carolina Legislature repealed sections 7A-608
through 7A-610 to create a separate juvenile code. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 to
-610 (1995) (repealed 1999) (recodified as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2200 to -2204 (1999)).
The recodification does not change any of this Note's analysis or discussion.
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the United States Constitution, or article I, section 27 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution.26
In determining these issues, the court first addressed whether North
Carolina had an unconstitutionally vague system for transfer that would
have violated the defendant's due process rights.27 The court utilized the
two-prong standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Grayned v. City of Rockfordz and upheld the validity of North Carolina's
transfer statute.29
The court then discussed the constitutionality of the mandatory life
sentence.0 Upholding the sentence, the court refused to recognize the
differences in language found in the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and in article I, section 27 of the North Carolina
Constitution." Furthermore, the court held that the sentence fell within
the prevailing views of society, and rejected an argument urging reversal
based on the disproportionate nature of the sentence to the crime com-
mitted.32
26. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 833 (holding that North Carolina courts do not recognize
a difference between the "cruel" and "unusual" punishment provisions of the federal and
state constitutions). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.") (em-
phasis added) with N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1997) ("Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.") (emphasis
added).
27. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823 (stating that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it
does not "contain sufficiently definite criteria to govern a court's exercise of discretion").
28. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
29. See id. at 108 (holding that a municipal anti-noise ordinance prohibiting persons
from making loud noises that disrupt a school in session was not unconstitutionally vague);
Green, 502 S.E.2d at 824 (listing the two-prong test).
30. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827-28 (explaining the three-fold argument asserted by
Green to illustrate that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment). Green first
argued that a sentence of a mandatory life term did not "comport with current societal
standards of decency." Id. at 828. Next, Green asserted that the U.S. Constitution re-
quired that his sentence be in proportion to the crime that he committed. See id. Third,
he contended that his sentence was cruel or unusual punishment because he would be the
only 13-year-old in the history of the state to receive a mandatory life sentence for a first-
degree sexual offense. See id.; see also infra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining
the legislative acts that made this anomaly possible).
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (providing the text of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 27 of the North Caro-
lina Constitution, respectively).
32. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 831. The majority explained the numerous instances
where the public expressed concern about the increase in juvenile crime. See id at 829-30.
This public concern caused the Governor of North Carolina to mandate the General As-
sembly sit for an extra session to address crime issues. See id. at 830. Furthermore, the
majority points out that numerous groups including prosecutors, police officers, victims of
crime, and educators expressed as their biggest concern the increase in violent crime
2000]
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Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Frye agreed with the
majority concerning the validity of the transfer statute.33 Justice Frye dis-
sented from the majority, however, because he reasoned that it was un-
likely that the North Carolina Legislature meant to create a five-month
window in which a thirteen-year-old convicted of a first-degree sexual of-
fense would be sentenced to a mandatory life sentence 4 Justice Frye
also acknowledged the "unusualness" of the defendant's sentence and
stated that under article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution,
the sentence should have been disregarded.35
This Note first examines recognition by the courts that the due process
rights guaranteed by the Constitution apply to juvenile offenders as well
as adult offenders. Next, this Note analyzes North Carolina's system of
transferring juveniles to adult criminal court and whether the statutes in-
volved are unconstitutionally vague. This Note then discusses whether
the imposition of a mandatory life sentence for a first-degree sexual of-
fense is cruel and/or unusual punishment. Finally, this Note analyzes the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in State v. Green and con-
cludes that although the transfer statutes are constitutionally valid, the
dissenting opinion is correct in stating that the imposition of the manda-
committed by juveniles. See id.; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989)
(noting that the Court does not look to its own perceptions of decency when determining
if a sentence is within the prevailing views of society; instead, the conceptions of modem
American society are the controlling factor).
33. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that the majority correctly upheld the validity of North Carolina's transfer stat-
utes).
34. See id. (recognizing that this case centers around two independent legislative acts
that, when combined, adversely effected no one except Andre Green). The first act,
passed by the North Carolina Legislature, effective May 1, 1994, reduced the minimum
age of transfer to adult criminal court from 14 to 13 years of age. See id. at 834-35 (refer-
ring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1995) (repealed 1999)). But see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2200. The second act, effective October 1, 1994, abolished the sentence of mandatory
life imprisonment for those convicted of a first-degree sexual offense. See Green, 502
S.E.2d at 834 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (1986), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1340.17 (1997)). Andre Demetrius Green raped his victim on July 27, 1994. See
Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823. He was the only 13-year-old between the months of May and
October that committed the crime of first-degree sexual offense, and therefore he was,
and will be, the only person in the history of the State of North Carolina to be sentenced
to a mandatory life sentence for that crime. See ia at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
35. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834-35 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The dissent expresses doubt that North Carolina's General Assembly knew that it
created a five-month period subjecting defendants such as Andre Green to a mandatory
life sentence. See id. at 835. Although states may afford greater protections in their
criminal justice systems than the federal system, they may not fall below the minimum
standards established by the U.S. Constitution. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1013-14 (1983).
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tory life sentence in this case is cruel or unusual punishment.
I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE SERIOUS YOUTHFUL
OFFENDER
A. The Process of Transferring Juvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal
Court
The Supreme Court took the first step toward providing procedural
due process rights to juveniles in Kent v. United States. 6 Prior to this
case, society did not consider juveniles "criminals"; thus, an assumption
existed that they did not need the due process protections afforded to
adults." In Kent, the police arrested the defendant for housebreaking,
rape, and robbery.3 The police then delivered him to the juvenile court
36. 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989)
(establishing the minimum age of a death sentence at 16 years). In 1989, 37 states had
capital punishment available as a sentence, while 15 of those states did not permit a death
sentence on 16-year-olds and 12 did not permit 17-year-olds to receive a death sentence.
See id. at 370. Based on these statistics the Stanford Court held that "[t]his does not es-
tablish the degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to la-
bel a particular punishment cruel and unusual." Id. at 370-71; see also Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that sentencing a 15-year-old murderer to death
was cruel and unusual punishment); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)
(holding that the age of a juvenile can be a mitigating factor when applying the death pen-
alty); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that if a juvenile court adjudicated
a juvenile, a subsequent trial in adult criminal court violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (reaffirming the
Court's holding in Haley v. Ohio); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948) (holding that
confessions by juveniles must conform to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Caro-
lina Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 9 n.1, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819
(N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96) (noting that many cases decided before and after Kent guaran-
teed certain constitutional protections to juveniles).
37. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (explaining that at the time of the
promulgation of the juvenile justice system, some reformers believed that juveniles did not
need due process protections).
38. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
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for adjudication. 39 After a full investigation,4 the juvenile court judge
decided to transfer the case to adult criminal court.4' The judge made
this decision without ruling on the defendant's motion for retention of
jurisdiction by the juvenile court and without conducting a hearing or in-
terviewing the defendant, his parents, or his counsel. 2
The Supreme Court in Kent provided much needed guidance to juve-
nile court judges faced with the decision of whether to transfer a juvenile
to adult criminal court.43 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, held
39. See id. Kent broke into a woman's apartment and raped her. See id. The police
arrested him after lifting his fingerprints from inside the victim's house. See id. After ar-
riving at police headquarters and enduring a seven-hour interrogation, Kent admitted to
committing the crimes. See id. at 543-44. He then went to a "receiving home for children"
and remained in detention there for approximately one week without an arraignment or a
probable cause hearing. See id. at 544-45. During this detention, Kent's mother retained
counsel who promptly gave notice to the juvenile court of Kent's intention to oppose
transfer of jurisdiction. See id. at 545. Kent's counsel also attempted to obtain a copy of
his client's Social Service file, which contained all Kent's juvenile court records used by
the judge in making his transfer decision. See id. at 546.
40. See id. at 546; cf Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The
Pee court stated that a "full" investigation "means an inquiry not only into the facts of the
alleged offense but also into the question whether the parens patriae plan of procedure is
desirable and proper in the particular case." ld at 559.
41. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 546 (noting that the juvenile court judge did not rule on any
motions, hold any hearings, confer with Kent's counsel, or provide a statement of reasons
for his transfer order). When a juvenile court judge decides if a transfer is proper in the
District of Columbia (the jurisdiction that adjudicated Kent), the judge is required to con-
duct a full investigation:
"If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would
amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense
which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the
judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for
trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of
such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the pow-
ers conferred upon the juvenile court ... in conducting and disposing of such
cases."
Id. at 547-48 (emphasis added) (quoting D.C. CODE § 11-1553 (Supp. IV 1965)).
42. See id. at 546. The majority recognized that the underlying goal of the juvenile
court is to determine the needs of the juvenile as well as that of society, not to adjudicate
criminal conduct. See id. at 554. It follows then that the juvenile justice system provides
treatment and rehabilitation to juveniles, rather than affixing punishment. See id. The
Kent Court cautioned, however, that even though the state acts as parens patriae, it cannot
adjudicate juveniles arbitrarily. See id. at 554-55.
43. See generally id. The majority did not decide the merits of the transfer decision;
they simply stated that "there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assis-
tance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554. Challenging the procedures,
or lack thereof, utilized by the juvenile court judge, the majority asserted that it was obvi-
ous such behavior would not be tolerated in adult criminal court. See id.
[Vol. 49:643
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that this transfer order was invalid." The majority found that when a ju-
venile court decides to transfer its jurisdiction to an adult criminal court,
the court has to provide the defendant with a hearing, all relevant rec-
ords, and a recitation of the factors that led to the transfer decision.45
The Court then created a list of factors for lower courts to utilize when
deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court.6 By cre-
ating these factors, the Kent Court ensured that the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution would protect juveniles who committed crimes seri-
44. See id. at 552-53 (noting that the juvenile court has wide discretion as to whether
to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court, but stating that this discretion must include
"procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic re-
quirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory require-
ment of a 'full investigation"').
45. See id. at 557 (relying on constitutional principles of due process and effective as-
sistance of counsel); see also R.S. v. Georgia, 274 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that Georgia statutory law is consistent with Kent, in that the court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a juvenile can be transferred to criminal court).
Though the juvenile court has discretion with regard to whom it recommends for transfer,
it cannot deny the juvenile the right to a hearing by simply waiving jurisdiction. See id
46. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67. The Court listed the following factors:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the pro-
tection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury re-
sulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined
by consultation with the United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when
the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged
with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by considera-
tion of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of liv-
ing.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts
with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts
and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this court, or prior commit-
ments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rea-
sonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the al-
leged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available
to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 566-67. But see State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 119 S. Ct. 883 (1999) (noting that the Supreme Court did not make the factors enunci-
ated in Kent a constitutional requirement and that, therefore, they are not binding in
North Carolina courts).
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ous enough to warrant a transfer to adult criminal court.47
One year later, In re Gault4 expanded the ruling in Kent, and held that
juveniles had the same due process rights as adults.49 While his parents
were at work, the police arrested Gerald Gault for allegedly making ob-
scene telephone calls to his neighbor.0 The police neither gave Gault's
parents notice as to where and why he was taken into custody, nor took
steps to ensure that his parents would be notified.
The Gault Court radically transformed the procedures accorded to ju-
veniles who are deemed delinquent. First, the Court required that
authorities give notice of the charges to the juvenile and his parents be-
fore scheduled court proceedings, so they would have adequate time to
prepare a defense. 3 Second, the Court mandated that when a juvenile
47. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67 (noting that when the court is contemplating waiving
jurisdiction it will be an officer of the court's responsibility to address all of these factors,
though not all of them will be relevant in all cases); see also supra note 10 and accompa-
nying text (citing the relevant portions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution).
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. See id. at 21 (concluding that there is no danger of states "abandon[ing]" the
"benefits" of the juvenile justice system simply because due process rights have been
established for juveniles); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that
prior to Kent, juveniles had no due process rights).
50. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. The sheriff took Gault, who was on probation, into cus-
tody for allegedly making the obscene telephone calls on June 8, 1964. See id. Gault went
to a Children's Detention Home, and he remained in custody even though his parents
were not notified of his whereabouts. See id. at 5.
51. See id. at 5. Eventually his parents learned where he was and were informed that
there would be a juvenile court hearing concerning their son the following day. See id.
The juvenile court judge conducted the hearing in his chambers with the complainant ab-
sent, without sworn testimony, and without a court stenographer to make a record of the
proceeding. See id. After the hearing, Gault returned to the Detention Center and was
not allowed to leave until June 11 or 12. See id. at 6. On June 15, the Court held another
hearing concerning the Gault matter, and after the meeting, the judge deemed Gerald
Gault a juvenile delinquent, sentencing him to the State Industrial School until he was 21
years old. See id. at 7. This was a six-year "sentence" because Gault was a 15-year-old
when he allegedly made the lewd calls. See id. at 7-8. At the habeas corpus hearing, the
juvenile court judge testified that he found Gault delinquent based on an ordinance that
made it unlawful to make lewd comments in the presence of woman and children. See id.
at 8. This crime, if committed by an adult, is a misdemeanor with a penalty consisting of a
five to fifty dollar fine or two months jail time. See id. at 8-9.
52. See generally id. at 30-57 (providing the essential elements of due process to juve-
niles); see also Mills, supra note 1, at 916 (explaining that Gault impacted the juvenile jus-
tice system by providing juveniles with the same procedural due process rights given to
adults).
53. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 32-33. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mrs. Gault
knew from the moment Gerald was put in the detention home that the state was charging
him with an offense. See id. at 32. The Arizona court also held that a notice requirement
was inappropriate because it is the policy of the juvenile court to keep juveniles out of the
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faces a proceeding that may result in his commitment to an institution,
the state must advise him and his parents of the juvenile's right to coun-
sel.A Lastly, the Court held that the state must afford both the juvenile
the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses as well as protection against
self-incrimination. 5
Gault represented a major shift in the procedural rights afforded to ju-
veniles in the United States because it guaranteed that states would have
to apprise juveniles of their rights and protect them from arbitrary judg-
56ments. It also paved the way for states to create a more constitutionally
sensitive criminal justice system for juveniles, whether in juvenile or
adult criminal court. 7
1. North Carolina's System of Transfer
North Carolina is among the minority of states that allow juvenile of-
fenders below age fourteen to be transferred to adult criminal court for
adjudication.58 Before the court can transfer jurisdiction to an adult
public eye. See id. Justice Fortas, in his majority opinion, held that the notice requirement
in juvenile proceedings is the same as that constitutionally required in adult court. See id.
at 33. "It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents'
right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hear-
ing, of the specific issues that they must meet." Id. at 33-34.
54. See id. at 41. The majority explained that at least one-third of the states provide
juveniles with the right to be represented by retained counsel, notice of that right, or to
have assigned counsel in juvenile court proceedings. See id. at 37-38. Furthermore, the
majority cited to the President's Crime Commission report, which stated that it was essen-
tial that juveniles be represented by counsel in proceedings that could result in "'coercive
-action"' against the juvenile. See id. at 38. Based on these facts the Court concluded
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in re-
spect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment
to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his
parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained
by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child.
Id. at 41.
55. See id. at 56-57. The majority held that the state cannot deem a juvenile delin-
quent unless there is sworn testimony against him and he is afforded the right to cross-
examine the witnesses providing that testimony. See id at 57. The majority further stated
that the state must obtain confessions, which might alleviate the need to cross-examine
witnesses, within the constitutional requirements of criminal procedure. See id. at 56-57.
56. See generally id.; Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of
North Carolina Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 8, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d
819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96) (noting that the Gault Court rejected the notion of parens
patriae because the majority felt that the doctrine led to arbitrary and unfair adjudication
of juveniles).
57. See generally Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-57 (mandating due process procedures in juve-
nile court).
58. See supra note 20 (listing states that allow transfer of juveniles to adult criminal
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criminal court, North Carolina requires that it provide the juvenile with
adequate notice of the charges against him, a hearing based on the
charges, and proof of probable cause that the juvenile committed the
unlawful act.59
The probable cause hearing resembles the hearing mandated by the
Supreme Court in Gault in that separate counsel must represent both the
state and the juvenile.6° Moreover, the juvenile may, but is not required
to, testify on his behalf.6' The juvenile also is allowed to call and examine
all witnesses.62 If the court finds probable cause in accordance with sec-tion 7A-609 of the North Carolina Code,63 the prosecutor may request
court); see also UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 15, at 207, 218 (providing sta-
tistics regarding the growing problem of juvenile crime in the United States in 1995). Ju-
veniles age 18 and younger accounted for 18.3% of all arrests in 1995. See id at 218.
Moreover, juveniles under the age of 15 accounted for 6.2% of arrests in the same period.
See id.
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1995) (repealed 1999) (recodified as N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-2200). North Carolina's transfer statute provides:
Transfer of jurisdiction of juvenile to superior court.
After notice, hearing, and a finding of probable cause the court may, [upon mo-
tion of the prosecutor or the juvenile's attorney or upon its own motion], transfer
jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court if the juvenile was 13 years of age or
older at the time the juvenile allegedly committed an offense that would be a fel-
ony if committed by an adult. If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony
and the court finds probable cause, the court shall transfer the case to the supe-
rior court for trial as in the case of adults.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (1999). The bracketed material in the above quote denotes
the changes section 7B-2200 made to section 7A-608.
60. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609(b)(1)-(2) (1995) (repealed 1999) (recodified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(b)(1)-(2) (1999)). "At the probable cause hearing: (1) A
prosecutor [shall] represent the State; (2) The juvenile shall be represented by counsel B."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(b)(1)-(2). The bracketed material in the above quote denotes
the changes section 7B-2202(b)(1)-(2) made to section 7A-609(b)(1)-(2). See also supra
notes 11-13 and accompanying text (highlighting the positive and negative aspects of pro-
viding juveniles with the same due process rights as adults).
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609(b)(3)-(4) (1995) (repealed 1999) (recodified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(b)(3)-(4) (1999)). "At the probable-cause hearing: (3) The
juvenile may testify[, call, and examine witnesses, and present evidence]; and (4) Each
witness [shall] testify under oath or affirmation and be subject to cross-examination." The
bracketed material in the above quote denotes the changes section 7B-2202 (b)(3)-(4)
made to section 7A-609(b)(3)-(4).
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(b)(3).
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(a).
(a) The court shall conduct a hearing to determine probable cause in all felony
cases in which a juvenile was 13 years of age or older when the offense was alleg-
edly committed. [The hearing shall be conducted within 15 days of the date of
the juvenile's first appearance. The court may continue the hearing for good
cause.]
Id. The bracketed material in the above quote denotes the changes section 7B-2202(a)
made to section 7A-609(a).
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transfer of the proceedings to adult criminal court.6 The judge then must
analyze the effects on the juvenile and the safety of the transfer state to
determine if the juvenile's actions necessitate a transfer from the juvenile
court to the appropriate adult criminal courti6 If the judge determines
that either of these interests necessitates the transfer of jurisdiction, he
must state his reasons with specificity.67 The appropriateness of transfer
64. See id. § 7B-2202(e)-(f).
([e]) If probable cause is found and transfer to superior court is not required by
G.S. 7[B-2200, upon motion ofi the prosecutor or the juvenile['s attorney or upon
its own motion, the court shall either proceed to a transfer hearing or set a date
for that hearing. If the juvenile has not received notice of the intention to seek
transfer at least five days prior to the probable cause hearing, the court, at the
request of the juvenile, shall continue the transfer hearing.]
([fl) If [the court does not find] probable cause [for a felony offense, the court
shall: 1) Dismiss the proceeding, or 2) If the court finds probable cause to believe
the that juvenile committed a lesser included offense that would constitute a mis-
demeanor if committed by an adult, either proceed to an adjudicatory hearing or
set a date for that hearing.]
Id. The bracketed material in the above quote represents the changes section 7B-2202(e)-
(f) made to section 7A-610(a)-(b).
Section 7B-2203(b) of the North Carolina Code provides that:
(b) In the transfer hearing, the court shall determine whether the protection of
the public and the needs of the juvenile will be served by transfer of the case to
superior court and shall consider the following factors: (1) The age of the juve-
nile; (2) The maturity of the juvenile; (3) The intellectual functioning of the juve-
nile; (4) The prior record of the juvenile; (5) Prior attempts to rehabilitate the ju-
venile; (6) Facilities or programs available to the court prior to the expiration of
the court's jurisdiction under this Subchapter and the likelihood that the juvenile
would benefit from treatment or rehabilitative efforts.
Id.
In contrast to North Carolina's transfer statute that encompasses all felony cases, New
Mexico classifies juveniles into three categories, and that classification controls application
of its transfer statute. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-3 (Michie 1995). The first category "de-
linquent offender," refers to a juvenile who can only be subject to adjudication within the
juvenile justice system and who is not eligible for transfer to adult criminal court. See id.
§ 32A-2-3(C). The second category, "serious youthful offender," applies to a juvenile be-
tween the ages of 15 and 18, who has been indicted for first-degree murder and is auto-
matically transferred to adult criminal court. See id. § 32A-2-3(H). The third category
"youthful offender," means a juvenile between ages 15 and 18, who commits the crime of
second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a violent felony, kidnapping, aggra-
vated battery, shooting from a dwelling or car, dangerous use of explosives, criminal sex-
ual penetration, robbery, or aggravated burglary or arson. See id. § 32A-2-3(I). Only
"youthful offenders" are subject to New Mexico's transfer statute. See id
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2202(e)-(f).
66. See id.
67. See id. § 7B-2203(c); see also In re Bunn, 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (N.C. App. 1977)
(explaining that the juvenile court judge need only state his reasons for transferring juris-
diction, and that he need not make findings of fact to support his decision of transfer).
The Bunn court explained that the juvenile court judge's findings of fact included the seri-
ousness of the offense, the defendant's past criminal history, as well as the societal interest
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is a decision within the sole discretion of the presiding juvenile court
judge.6' This judicial interpretation of the deferential standard of review
has lead to criticism that the transfer statute is unconstitutionally vague.69
2. Due Process and Vagueness
When analyzing due process rights with respect to transfer statutes, a
common argument, and one central to Green, is that the statutes are un-
constitutionally vague.7° The vagueness argument surfaces because some
transfer statutes provide that the juvenile court judge has sole discretion
to make the decision on whether to transfer the juvenile to adult criminal
court.7' Like North Carolina's transfer statute, these laws provide juve-
nile court judges with very little guidance in making the transfer
72determination.
in protecting its citizens from criminal predators. See id.
68. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 823 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. ,
119 S. Ct. 883 (1999); Bunn, 239 S.E.2d at 484 (holding that in North Carolina the decision
of whether to transfer a juvenile is within the sole discretion of the trial judge).
69. See Bunn, 239 S.E.2d at 484 (stating that the juvenile court judge did not abuse
his discretion because he considered the violent nature of the crime, the criminal history of
the defendant, and the state's interest in protecting its citizens from violent predators).
70. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823 (noting Green's argument that North Carolina's
transfer statute was unconstitutionally vague because it provided no meaningful direction
for judges on how to decide whether the transfer was valid); cf BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1574 (6th ed. 1990) ("A law which is so obscure in its promulgation that a
reasonable person could not determine from a reading what the law purports to command
or prohibit is void as violative of due process."). For a discussion of cases regarding vague
statutes, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (arguing that a statute
that prohibited the creation of a disturbance that disrupts a school was unconstitutionally
vague because the conduct sought to be prevented was not specifically expressed); Cramp
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1961) (holding that a statute that re-
quired a person take an oath swearing not to support the Communist party was unconsti-
tutionally vague because it provided no clear method of compliance with the rule); United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947) (explaining a statute prohibiting people from forc-
ing radio stations to hire more employees than they actually needed was unconstitutionally
vague because it violated the Fifth Amendment by creating a crime with ambiguous lan-
guage); In re Burrus, 169 S.E.2d 879, 888-89 (N.C. 1969) (determining that a statute pro-
hibiting persons from impeding the flow of traffic and a statute that proscribed interrupt-
ing and disturbing a public school were unconstitutionally vague); and State v. Hales, 122
S.E.2d 768, 770, 772-74 (N.C. 1961) (finding that a statute that made shoplifting a crime
was not unconstitutionally vague because it delineated with precision the proscribed act).
71. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (1999); see also Bunn, 239 S.E.2d at 484 (holding
that the decision of whether to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court is within the sole
discretion of the juvenile court judge).
72. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823 (quoting the text of section 7A-610 of the North
Carolina Code). The Green court declined to consider whether section 7A-610 of the
North Carolina Code, when examined alone, was void for vagueness. See id. at 823-25.
Instead, the court chose to take a broader approach and examined the transfer statute in
conjunction with the entire criminal and juvenile code and determined that the statue was
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In Grayned v. City of Rockford," the United States Supreme Court
delineated the standard for determining whether a statute is void for
vagueness." Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, created a two-
pronged test for making this determination. 5 The first prong states that
the law must be clear enough to give a person with reasonable intelli-
gence knowledge of forbidden conduct so that the person can alter his
actions to comport with the law.76 The second prong requires laws to
have instructions clearly expressed within their text, so that judges will
know how to apply them."
North Carolina created protections against vague statutes even before
the United States Supreme Court ruled on the issue in Grayned.8 In In
re Burrus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina developed a similar test
to that promulgated in Grayned.79 Here, the court first interpreted stat-
utes prohibiting citizens from impeding the flow of vehicular traffic, and
second, examined statutes that made it unlawful to disrupt, by way of
making loud noises, a public or private school.8° The court stated that
not unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 825.
73. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
74. See id. at 108-09 (finding that a city anti-noise ordinance prohibiting persons from
making loud noises that disrupt a school in session was not unconstitutionally vague).
75. See id. The court delineated three reasons why vague statutes are detrimental to
society. See id. at 108-09. Only the first two, however, represent the test created by the
majority to determine whether a statute is void for vagueness. See id. The first reason
why vague statutes are detrimental to society is that vague statutes do not help citizens
adjust their behavior to comport with the law's requirements. See id. at 108. The second
reason is that it is essential that the law enforcement personnel charged with implementing
the law do so fairly and consistently. See id. at 108-09. The third reason is that vague stat-
utes have the ability in some instances to violate First Amendment rights, thereby re-
stricting a person's freedom of speech. See id. at 109.
76. See id. at 108 (explaining that "[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not pro-
viding fair warning.").
77. See id. "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dan-
gers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Id. at 108-09.
78. See In re Burrus, 169 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. 1969).
79. See id. at 888. The Burrus court held:
It is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. A stat-
ute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application violates the first essential of due process of law .... When the
language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it con-
demns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to in-
terpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
80. See Burrus, 169 S.E.2d at 881, 883. Barbara Burrus was charged with deliberately
standing on a portion of a busy highway and stopping the flow of traffic in violation of
state law. See id. at 881-82. James Howard was charged with deliberately interrupting a
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when deciding if a statute is void for vagueness, an initial determination
should be made on whether a person of ordinary intelligence would have
to guess at the statute's meaning.8 Next, the court reasoned that the
statute meets constitutional requirements if it provides an initial ade-
quate warning and is clear enough for judges and juries to implement.8
The holding in Burrus provided the framework for the Green court's in-
quiry into the constitutional validity of North Carolina's transfer stat-
ute.83 The court, however, looked to the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution for guidance in evaluating the constitutional-
ity of Green's punishment.r4
B. The Evolution of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Debate
Scholars debate the precise meaning of the words "cruel and unusual
punishment," written in the Eighth Amendment, 5 and have done so
since the days of the Magna Carta.6 Nevertheless, in American jurispru-
dence, those words in the Eighth Amendment "draw [their] meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.' 7
Three cases in which the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment are Gregg v. Georgia,8 Solem v.
school that was in session by making rude and riotous noises outside the school in viola-
tion of state law. See id. at 882-83.
81. See id. at 888; see also Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287
(1961).
82. See Burrus, 169 S.E.2d at 887; see also Cramp, 368 U.S. at 287 (holding that a
Florida statute that required state employees to take a loyalty oath against the Communist
Party was unconstitutionally vague).
83. See State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 824 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
119 S. Ct. 883 (1999) (stating the holding of Grayned and illustrating that the identical rule
of law was created prior to Grayned in Burrus).
84. See id. at 827-28. This Note contends that the Green court should have looked to
article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution, which is a broader provision than
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
86. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 & n.32 (1958) (holding that the phrase "cruel
and unusual punishment" is to be interpreted as one phrase with no difference between
cruel punishments and unusual punishments).
87. Id. at 101; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). "In discerning
those 'evolving standards,' we have looked to objective evidence of how our society views
a particular punishment today. The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of con-
temporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." Id. (citations
omitted); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment mandates that the court look to the prevailing views of society in determining
if punishments are cruel and unusual).
88. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (holding that a death sentence for the crime of murder does not
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Helm,89 and Harmelin v. Michigan.9° In Gregg, the Court analyzed
whether a death sentence for a convicted murderer was cruel and un-
usual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.9' After
finding that a death sentence was not per se unconstitutional, the Court
created a two-pronged test to determine whether a punishment is exces-
sive within the bounds of the Eighth Amendment.92 The first prong
stated that whatever the punishment, it cannot involve an unnecessary
and unwarranted infliction of pain.93 The second prong delineated that
the punishment inflicted must be in proportion to the crime committed.
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, cautioned, however, that when de-
termining the validity of a democratically created statute, the unelected
judiciary should be wary and presume the statute's validity.95
The Solem Court expanded and clarified the second prong enunciated
by the Gregg Court.96 In Solem, the Court reviewed a South Dakota case
that sentenced a six-time convicted felon to life imprisonment for forging
a check in the amount of one hundred dollars.9 Relying on Gregg, the
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
89. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court overturned a life sentence imposed
upon a defendant who was found guilty of his seventh felony, the last of which was forging
a check. See id. at 281. In so holding, the Court stated although the judiciary must show
substantial deference to legislatures enacting sentencing schemes, the sentence must be
proportionate to the crime committed. See id. at 290.
90. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Harmelin Court modified the Eighth Amendment pro-
portionality principle and agreed that courts should use the Solem objective criteria analy-
sis only in cases where the defendant's sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to the of-
fense. See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
91. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (deline-
ating the semantic difference between the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
and article I, section 27, of the North Carolina Constitution).
92. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
93. See id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. (9
Otto) 130, 136 (1879).
94. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958);
Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
95. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175; see also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND
METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 54-55 (1992) (explaining the counter-majoritarian
difficulty). "'[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act ... it
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."' Id. (quoting
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (2d. ed. 1986).
96. See generally Solem, 463 U.S. 277; Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957; Gregg, 428 U.S. 153;
State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 643 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing Solem, Harmelin, and
Gregg).
97. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 277, 281 (noting that the defendant had been convicted
under the state's recidivist statute because he had six prior felony convictions, and that the
statute carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for a Class 1 felony); see also S.D.
2000]
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Solem Court held that regardless of the crime, the sentence imposed
must be in proportion to the crime committed.9" The Court further stated
that if courts find it necessary to conduct an Eighth Amendment analysis
on a particular punishment, they should be guided by an objective analy-
sis of certain factors.99 First, it is important to look at the seriousness of
the crime as well as the subsequent punishment.'O Second, courts should
conduct an analysis of how the state treats other criminals."' This analy-
sis determines whether or not criminals who commit more serious crimes
are subject to a less severe penalty-a certain indication of the exces-
siveness of the sentence in question. °2 Lastly, the Court suggested that
an analysis of how other jurisdictions adjudicate the crime is beneficial.0 3
Thus, judges using these objective criteria should view them "in light of
the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpabil-
ity of the offender."" 4
In Harmelin, Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, rejecting
the Solem three-pronged test for proportionality.' Justice Scalia at-
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (Michie 1998) ("If a defendant has been convicted of three or
more felonies in addition to the principal felony and one or more of the prior felony con-
victions was for a crime of violence... the sentence for the principal felony shall be en-
hanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony.").
98. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 (citing Justice Stewart's warning in Gregg that the
courts should grant "substantial deference" to the legislatures who are democratically
elected to create the law); see also KAPLIN, supra note 95 at 54-55 (explaining the counter-
majoritarian difficulty as the reason why the courts must show deference to the legisla-
tures).
99. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
100. See id. (explaining that prior precedents examined the harshness of the offense);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (noting that the Court compared such criminal
offenses as rape and murder); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (study-
ing the nature of the crime); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363, 365 (1910) (rec-
ognizing repeatedly that the offense was, in the grand scheme of things, insignificant).
101. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
102. See id. (noting that in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795 (1982), the Court de-
cided that the petitioner was less culpable than the rest of his brethren on death row).
Also, the Weems Court provided a list of more serious crimes that were subject to less se-
rious penalties. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
103. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92 (noting that the Edmund Court studied capital
punishment statutes and concluded that the defendant would have been subjected to a
death sentence according to approximately one-third of the statutes). Furthermore, in
Weems, the Court discovered that a comparable crime, under federal law, subjected the
defendant to two years in prison and a fine. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 380.
104. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (explaining that the "[a]pplication of these factors assumes
that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense.., and [that] courts tradition-
ally have made these judgments-just as legislatures must make them in the first in-
stance").
105. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-90 (1991).
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tacked the first prong, which spoke of the gravity of the offense, pointing
to its incompleteness because it made no mention of how to determine
what other crimes were as grave or more grave as the original offense."°
He then commented that these inadequate standards made the criteria
unmistakably subjective rather than objective.'O Each individual judge's
value system, he argued, would determine the criteria with no set factors
to formulate that determinationlW
Next, Justice Scalia challenged the second prong of Solem, reasoning
that it would be impossible to compare offenses of similar gravity be-
cause, as the first prong illustrated, there was no way to determine that
standard.' Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the third prong, conceding
that analyzing how other jurisdictions adjudicated the same crime would
be practical and conceivable, but finding that this criterion had no basis
in the Eighth Amendment."0
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Souter and
O'Connor, modified the proportionality principle, finding that it does
exist in narrow circumstances.' This concurring opinion has been most
influential and is recognized as the state of the law today."' Justice Ken-
nedy based his contentions on the principle of stare decisis, holding that
prior Supreme Court decisions delineate the aspects of proportionality
106. See id. at 986-90 (noting that an analysis of this type leads to subjective determi-
nations that are unrealistic). The Court further observed that in Louisiana the same
criminal sentence applies to a person who commits assault with a dangerous weapon as to
a person who removes a shopping basket from the grounds of the store. See id. at 987.
107. See id. at 986.
108. See id. at 988-89.
109. See id. at 988. Justice Scalia reasoned:
Judges will be comparing what they consider comparable. Or, to put the same
point differently: When it happens that two offenses judicially determined to be
"similarly grave" receive significantly dissimilar penalties, what follows is not
that the harsher penalty is unconstitutional, but merely that the legislature does
not share the judges' view that the offenses are similarly grave.
Id. (emphasis in original).
110. See id. at 989 (noting that some states choose to criminalize activity such as hunt-
ing endangered animals while others offer rewards for those that engage in similar activ-
ity). "That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish
with the mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may
criminalize an act that other States do not criminalize at all." Id. (emphasis in original).
111. See id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
112. See State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 643 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that the
Harmelin Court held that the Solem analysis was only to be used when the sentence was
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 830-31 (N.C.
1998), cert. denied,_ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 883 (1999) (quoting Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Harmelin).
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review.'13 In sum, Justice Kennedy postulated that there is no defined
proportionality between the crime and sentence mandated by the Eighth
Amendment."' Instead, he argued, the Eighth Amendment prohibits
outrageous sentences which are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime
committed."5
1. North Carolina and the Debate on Cruel and Unusual Punishment
a. North Carolina's Version of the Eighth Amendment
Article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that,
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.. '" 6  This language has been in
North Carolina's Constitution since it was amended in 1868.' Moreo-
ver, North Carolina courts acknowledge the differing language in the•. . 118
federal and state constitutions. In Medley v. North Carolina Depart-
ment of Corrections,"9 the North Carolina Supreme Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
113. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
114. See id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that courts recognize Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin as the prevailing law in the proportionality de-
bate).
115. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (emphasis added).
116. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27 (1984) (emphasis added).
117. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Caro-
lina Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 22, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C.
1998) (No. 519A96). The ACLU argued that:
[Tihe 1776 version of Article I, Section 27 used the word "nor" instead of the
word "or" between the words "cruel" and "unusual." In the Constitution of
1868, Article I, Section 27 was amended to read the way it does today: "Nor
[shall] cruel or unusual punishments [be] inflicted."
The change from the 1776 Constitution to the 1868 Constitution does not alter
the fundamental difference between this State's Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. To the contrary, the change from
"nor" to "or" in 1868 serves to highlight the fact that North Carolina's prohibi-
tion against certain punishments is broader than its federal counterpart. Those
attending the North Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1868 certainly were
aware that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited
cruel and unusual punishment; yet, Article I, Section 27 was not redrafted to mir-
ror the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. See Medley v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 412 S.E.2d 654, 659 (N.C.
1992).
119. 412 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1992).
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I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution were similar, but not
identical.' ° The court further recognized that because the North Caro-
lina Constitution creates more rights for its citizens, it is broader than its
federal counterpart."
b. North Carolina and First-Degree Sexual Offenses
Prior to October 1, 1994,122 North Carolina sentenced persons con-
victed of a first-degree sexual offense to life imprisonment.'3 Faced with
questions regarding the constitutional validity of the sentence, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the life imprisonment sentence was
not cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.'2 The court has extended this reasoning to uphold life
terms for convicted juvenile offenders.'2 For example, in State v.
126Rogers, the court examined whether a mandatory life sentence was
cruel and unusual punishment when applied to a fifteen-year-old boy
convicted of first-degree rape .12  The court held that unless otherwise
provided by a specific statute, there is no presumption of criminal inca-
120. See id. at 659.
121. See id. at 659-60 (Martin, J., concurring); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation in Support of Ap-
pellant at 22-23, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96) (explaining that
North Carolina courts have construed their state constitution more broadly than that of
the Federal Constitution).
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (1997) (abolishing mandatory life sentence
for all crimes except first-degree murder); see also State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C.
1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 883 (1999) (discussing the legislative act that pro-
hibited a mandatory life sentence for a first-degree sexual offense).
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (1993) (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.17 (1997)); Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
124. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 828. The Green court refused to recognize a linguistic
difference between the North Carolina and the Federal Constitutions; consequently, the
court's discussion focused on the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
See id. The court failed to recognize that although the United States Constitution sets out
the minimal standard, North Carolina was free to create broader provisions than those of
the Federal Constitution. Cf California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983); State v. Hig-
ginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (N.C. 1985) (holding that a prosecution for first-degree
sexual offense that subjects a defendant to a mandatory life sentence is not cruel and un-
usual punishment).
125. See State v. Rogers, 168 S.E.2d 345, 351 (N.C. 1969) (upholding the mandatory
life sentence for a rape conviction of a 15-year-old juvenile as not being cruel and unusual
punishment). "When punishment does not exceed the limits fixed by statute it cannot be
classified as cruel and unusual in a constitutional sense unless the punishment provisions
of the statute itself are unconstitutional." Id. at 350 (citations omitted).
126. 168 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1969).
127. See id. at 351.
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pacity for youths over age fourteen.'8 Thus, the court determined that it
is constitutionally permissible to sentence a juvenile tried as an adult to a
mandatory life term.'29 Consequently, according to Rogers, the state can
subject a juvenile tried as an adult and convicted of rape to the statuto-
rily mandated sentence of life imprisonment.3 °
II. STATE V. GREEN:.. ENFORCING THE ADULT CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMES ON JUVENILES
The State of North Carolina arrested and convicted Andre Green for
raping a twenty-three-year-old woman.32 On July 27, 1994, the victim,
asleep in her bed, heard a banging noise on her back door.'33 She imme-
diately called the police for emergency assistance, and while she was on
the telephone with the operator, Green broke in through the back door
and repeatedly raped and molested her.M After abusing his victim un-
mercifully, he fled the scene when he heard the police enter the back
door of the victim's apartment. 35 Two witnesses identified Green leaving
the house, and later Green made a statement to the police admitting to
the attack.'3
On July 28, 1994, thirteen-year old Green appeared before the juvenile
court, charged with both first-degree rape and burglary.137 Twelve days
128. See id. at 353; see also State v. Johnson, 346 S.E.2d 596, 624 (N.C. 1986) (discuss-
ing the proposition that a criminal defendant's maturity is not necessarily determined by
his chronological age).
129. See Rogers, 168 S.E.2d at 351.
130. See id. at 353.
131. 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 883 (1999).
132. See id. at 822.
133. See id. (noting that the victim had experienced, for six weeks prior to the rape,
this same disturbing behavior of someone ringing her doorbell and banging on the doors
and the windows to her apartment).
134. See id. at 823. The victim was armed only with a golf club that she kept near her
bed. See id. at 822. She had this protection since the harassment involving the ringing of
her doorbell and the banging on her doors began. See id.
135. See id. at 823.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 822. North Carolina defines first-degree rape as:
(a) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the person engages in vaginal
intercourse: (1) With a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the de-
fendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim; or
(2) With another person by force and against the will of the other person, and: a.
Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the other
person reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or b. Inflicts se-
rious personal injury upon the victim or another person; or c. The person com-
mits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other persons.
(b) Any person who commits an offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class
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later, the prosecutor added a third charge of first-degree sexual offense.'
The district attorney, after conducting a probable cause hearing pursuant
to sections 7A-608 through 7A-612 of the North Carolina Code, success-
fully moved to transfer Green's case to adult criminal court."3 9 On Sep-
tember 13, 1994, the grand jury indicted Green on the three counts, for
which he was tried and found guilty.'4 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina granted discretionary review to assess the validity of both the
state's transfer statutes and Green's sentence of life imprisonment.
141
In Green, the Supreme Court of North Carolina faced two important
constitutional issues. First, the court examined the constitutional suffi-
ciency of North Carolina's transfer statute with respect to the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 43 Applying the two-pronged
B1 felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (Supp. 1998). Furthermore, North Carolina defines burglary
as:
If the crime be committed in a dwelling house, or in a room used as a sleeping
apartment in any building, and any person is in the actual occupation of any part
of said dwelling house or sleeping apartment at the time of the commission of
such crime, it shall be burglary in the first degree.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1993).
138. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822. In North Carolina:
(a) [a] person is guilty of a sexual offense in the first degree if the person engages
in a sexual act: (1) With a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the
defendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim;
or (2) With another person by force and against the will of the other person, and:
a. Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the
other person reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or b. In-
flicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person; or c. The person
commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other persons.
(b) Any person who commits an offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class
B1 felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (Supp. 1998).
139. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822. The district judge's reasons for transfer include:
[The] serious nature of the offenses; [The] victim [was] essentially a stranger to
the juvenile; [The] community's need to be aware of & protected from this seri-
ous type of criminal activity; [The] juvenile has a history of assaultive behavior
(fights in school) & juvenile acknowledges he had a very bad temper; [[and]]
[there was] strong evidence of probable cause presented based on testimony
from victim and juvenile's confession to law enforcement.
Id.; see also supra notes 59-64 (discussing the mechanics of North Carolina's transfer stat-
ute).
140. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 822 (noting that the trial court sentenced Green to a
mandatory life sentence for the first-degree sexual offense, a 6 year sentence for at-
tempted first-degree rape to run at the same time as the life sentence, and a 15 year sen-
tence for first-degree burglary to run consecutively after the life sentence).
141. See id. at 821-22.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 823-26.
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vagueness test delineated in Burrus and Grayned, the court proclaimed
the validity of sections 7A-608 and 7A-610 of the North Carolina Code.
1'4
The court recognized that the statute satisfied the first prong because a
person of ordinary intelligence could understand what the law prohib-
its.14'5 The second prong, however, forced the court to examine if the laws
provide clear standards of application.14 The majority held that North
Carolina's transfer statutes met this burden. 47 In making this decision,
the majority determined that it was important to analyze the entire North
Carolina criminal justice system as well as the transfer statute.14 1 Ulti-
mately, the majority determined that the statute sufficiently satisfied the
second prong.149
The court then evaluated whether sentencing a juvenile to a manda-
tory life sentence after transfer to adult criminal court was cruel and/or
unusual punishment, as defined by either the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution or article I, section 27 of the North Carolina
144. See id.
145. See id. at 824-25. The court addressed the notice requirement even though Green
did not assert that his due process rights were impinged due to inadequate notice. See id.
The court determined that a cursory examination of section 7A-610 would lead a person of
ordinary intelligence to also study section 7A-608 and, consequently, that a citizen of ordi-
nary intelligence would be able to understand the possibility of juvenile transfer to adult
criminal court. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 825-26. The court determined that when analyzing the aggregate of
criminal and juvenile law in North Carolina there was sufficient guidance to aid judges in
their transfer decisions. See id.
148. See id. at 825. "[Tlhe rules of statutory construction provide, where the language
of a statute is arguably ambiguous, that courts must give effect to legislative intent by ref-
erence inter alia to statutes in pari materia, those having a common purpose." Id.
149. See id. at 825-26. Examining North Carolina's transfer statute in pari materia, the
Green court looked first to section 7A-516(3) of the North Carolina Code. See id. at 825;
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516(3) (1995). Section 7A-516(3) explains that the pur-
pose of the Juvenile Code is "[t]o develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects
consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the child, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the family, and the protection of the public safety." Id. Next, the court studied
the goal of the Juvenile Code as well as the dispositions available to the juvenile court
judge. See id. The juvenile court judge is required, when considering dispositions, to take
into account numerous factors, including the "seriousness of the offense, the degree of
culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case and the age and prior rec-
ord" of the defendant. See id. at 826.
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Constitution.'o In affirming the decision of the court of appeals,"' the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment and ar-
ticle I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution should not be
treated differently, societal standards of decency approved of the pun-
ishment, the sentence was not disproportionate to the crime committed,
and a mandatory life sentence was not cruel and/or unusual punish-
ment.52
A. The Majority Opinion: Approving the Constitutionality of North
Carolina's Transfer Statutes and Determining that a Mandatory Life
Sentence for a Thirteen-Year-Old is Not Cruel and/or Unusual
Punishment'"
1. Upholding North Carolina's Transfer Statute
In Green, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the state's
transfer statute was not unconstitutionally vague.'- 4 In making this de-
termination, the court utilized the two-prong vagueness test enunciated
in Grayned and concluded that the methods of implementation of the
transfer statute did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
The Green majority began its probe into whether North Carolina vio-
lated Andre Green's due process rights by analyzing the text of section
7A-610 of the North Carolina Code.1 6 Green argued that section 7A-610
150. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827-34. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates upon the states the "cruel and unusual punishment" language of
the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.1 (1972) (Brennan J.,
concurring). The Eighth Amendment is, however, the minimal standard that the states
have to overcome, and it is settled law that "[s]tates are free to provide greater protections
in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires." California v. Ra-
mos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983).
151. See State v. Green, 477 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. App. 1996), affd 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C.
1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. -, 119 S. Ct. 883 (1999).
152. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827-34.
153. See id. With respect to the constitutionality of the transfer statute, the Green
court focused its discussion on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. See id. The court narrowed the discussion of whether Green's sentence was
cruel and/or unusual punishment by examining both the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. See id. at
827-28. The court determined, however, that the Eighth Amendment was the proper
standard to determine the outcome of the case. See id. at 828.
154. See id. at 826.
155. See id. at 824; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
(explaining the three-pronged test for determining if a statute is void for vagueness).
156. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823.
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was unconstitutionally vague because it provided "no meaningful guid-
ance to juvenile court judges, resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory
decisions regarding which juveniles to transfer to superior court."'57
These arbitrary decisions, Green contended, occurred because the deci-
sion of whether to transfer a juvenile to adult court was in the sole discre-
tion of the juvenile court judge.' Therefore, Green argued that the stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague and the implementation of the statute
violated his due process rights.'59
In reviewing Green's vagueness argument, the majority applied the
two-pronged test in Grayned.'6 The majority analyzed the first prong by
examining section 7A-610 in conjunction with section 7A-608, deter-
mining that North Carolina met the notice requirement. 6' The court rea-
soned that section 7A-610 states the criterion that allows a juvenile court
judge to invoke the transfer statute, and section 7A-608'62 gives the judge
a basis for making the transfer determination.' 63 The majority therefore
concluded that the statutes satisfied the first prong because, when read
together, the statutes make clear the possibility of a thirteen-year-old
having his case transferred for adjudication to adult criminal court.'"
Next, the court analyzed the second prong of the vagueness standard.'5
The majority reiterated that in making a determination of whether the
language of a statute is unclear, courts should look not only to the spe-
cific statute in question, but to other related statutes.'" The court held
that this is the only way to develop fully the scope of the legislative in-
tent, and to determine if the statute is ambiguous.'67 Laying this founda-
157. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 to -610 (1995) (repealed 1999).
158. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823; see also In re Bunn, 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (N.C. App.
1977) (noting that the juvenile court judge's determination is subject to review only when
there is a clear abuse of discretion).
159. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 823.
160. See id. at 825; see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
161. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 824-25 (noting that Green stipulated that the statute sat-
isfied the first prong of the vagueness standard).
162. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203(b) (1999) (providing that the juvenile court judge
may use as a basis for her decision whether "the needs of the juvenile or the best interest
of the State will be served by [a] transfer... to [adult criminal court]").
163. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (reporting that the North Carolina
Legislature repealed section 7A-608 of the North Carolina Code and replaced it with sec-
tion 7B-2200, which provides that a juvenile may be transferred to adult criminal court if
the juvenile was at least 13 years old at the time of the offense and the alleged crime would
have been a felony offense if it was committed by an adult).
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tion, the court examined section 7A-516(3)' 8 as well as sections 7A-646
to 7A-661'69 of the North Carolina Code to determine if, when read to-
gether with the transfer statute, they were collectively vague.' 70 The ma-
jority found that these statutes created two main factors for juvenile
court judges to weigh when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to su-
perior court?"
[First], the seriousness of the offense; and [second] the evolving
standards and will of the majority in society, as expressed
through the legislature, reflecting concern that the rapid in-
crease in the commission of serious, violent crimes by younger
and younger offenders must be dealt with more stringently than
was previously being done in the juvenile system.
7
1
Based on these factors and those already enumerated, the court held
that section 7A-610 of the North Carolina Code, when taken in the con-
text of the entire Code, did not violate Andre Green's due process
rights.1
3
Next, the majority determined whether the juvenile court judge cor-
rectly applied the transfer statute in Green.74 The court noted that the
statute required the juvenile court judge to state her reasons for transfer,
but that those reasons were within her sole discretion.7' The majority
determined that the juvenile court judge's decision satisfied both North
Carolina's statutory scheme and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 76 Accordingly, the court rejected Green's due pro-
168. See id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516(3) (1995) (repealed 1999)).
169. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-646 to 7A-661
(1995).
170. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825.
171. See id. at 826 (considering that the legislature recently amended section 7A-608 of
the North Carolina Code to reduce the minimum age of transfer from 14 years old to 13
years old).
172. Id.; see also id. at 829 (recognizing the prevailing view of society to lower the
minimum age of transfer); UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 15, at 207, 218
(documenting the rapid increase in juvenile crime).
173. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 826. Green urged the court to adopt the Kent factors as
controlling. See id. The court rejected this argument because the Supreme Court in Kent
did not make the factors constitutionally required. See id. at 827. Furthermore, the Green
court held that the juvenile court judges already essentially used the Kent factors, and to
mandate their use might unwittingly limit future judges from expanding the factors used in
the determination. See id. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203 (1999) (adopting some of
the Kent factors for the juvenile court judge to consider at the transfer hearing).
174. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827.
175. See id.; see also supra note 139 (quoting the juvenile court judge's considerations
in ordering the transfer).
176. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827.
2000]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:643
cess assignment of error.' 7
2. Rejecting the Eighth Amendment Argument
After holding Green's transfer to adult criminal court valid under the
laws of North Carolina and the United States, the court turned its atten-
tion to whether the imposition of a mandatory life sentence for first-
degree sexual offense was cruel and/or unusual punishment.1 The court
dismissed any distinction between cruel andor unusual punishment,
holding that North Carolina courts traditionally treat both article I, sec-
tion 27 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution the same.1 79 Having determined that
the decision in the Green case was consistent with both the federal law
and laws of North Carolina, the court turned to examining Green's as-
signments of error."8
First the majority examined whether Green's sentence was contrary to
societal standards by relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Trop v.
Dulles.11 In Trop, the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment draws
its application from the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."' The Green majority recognized that
the judiciary is not a representative body; therefore, it should show def-
erence to the legislature's determination of appropriate sentences by
presuming their validity."3 The majority then applied this "decency"
177. See id.
178. See id. at 827-28.
179. See id. at 828. See generally State v. Bronson, 423 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1992); State v.
Peek, 328 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1985); State v. Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834 (N.C. 1985); State
v. Fulcher, 243 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. 1978); State v. Rogers, 168 S.E.2d 345 (N.C. 1969). Like-
wise, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) that
there has never been a distinction drawn between those punishments that are cruel and
those that are unusual; instead, punishment is examined in terms of whether it violates
human standards of decency.
180. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827-28.
181. Cf. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (discussing
"evolving standards of decency" and their application).
182. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
183. See KAPLIN, supra note 95, at 54-55 (explaining that courts should show a great
deal of deference to legislatures because of the counter-majoritarian difficulty); see also
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,175 (1976). The Gregg Court reasoned that
in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against
the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the leg-
islature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected
is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy
burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of
the people ....
... [I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to
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standard, finding that the actions of North Carolina's legislature illus-
trated the appropriateness of Green's sentence."O Furthermore, the ma-
jority noted that North Carolina's appellate court had on numerous occa-
sions ruled that a mandatory life sentence was not cruel and unusual
punishment.'
Next, the majority examined the proportionality of Green's sentence
using the "grossly disproportionate" standard created in Justice Ken-
nedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin.'84 Green's principal proportion-
ality argument urged that because of his age, a mandatory life sentence
was disproportionate to his crime."" The majority rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the nature of the crime transcended the realm of those
usually committed by children. 8 Moreover, the majority felt that Green
was unamenable to treatment and that an adult sentence was the only
appropriate remedy for both the victim and the state.89 Finally, the ma-
jority considered whether Green's punishment was cruel and unusual be-
cause he would be the only thirteen-year old in the state's history to re-
ceive a mandatory life sentence for a first-degree sexual offense.'9 The
majority was not impressed by the fact that the legislature abolished the
statute imposing a mandatory life sentence for a first-degree sexual of-
fense approximately two months after Green committed the crime. 9'
Even though there were only five months where a thirteen-year-old
the will and consequently the moral values of the people.
Id.
184. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 829. The General Assembly lowered the minimum age
of transfer from 14 to 13 years old almost three months prior to the commission of Green's
crime. See id. Furthermore, "[a]lthough this state's... life imprisonment punishment of
thirteen-year-olds for a first-degree sexual offense would not be per se unconstitutional
even were it the only state to do so, the growing minority of states allowing such punish-
ment is indicative of the public sentiment toward violent youthful offenders." Id. at 831
(citations omitted).
185. See id. at 829; State v. Holley, 388 S.E.2d 110, 111 (N.C. 1990); State v. Cooke, 351
S.E.2d 290, 293 (N.C. 1987); State v. Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834,837 (N.C. 1985).
186. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-1009 (1991) (delineating Justice
Kennedy's "grossly disproportionate" standard).
187. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 832 (explaining that a defendant's age can be considered
in determining proportionality, but it is not dispositive because courts can look to other
factors such as criminal familiarity and sophistication, intelligence level, and seriousness of
the crime committed).
188. See id.
189. See id. (stating the factors that led the court to determine that Green could not be
treated, and noting the inherent unfairness of treating Green as a juvenile because he
would be released from juvenile custody only four years after committing the crime).
190. See id. at 833 (explaining how Green will be the only 13-year-old given a manda-
tory life sentence for a first-degree sexual offense).
191. See id.
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could have been subject to the same sentence as Green, the majority held
that the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.' 9 In
affirming the decision of the lower court, the majority simply enforced
what the law of the state allowed, and continued a growing trend toward
treating both juvenile and adult criminals equally.9
B. Justice Frye's Opinion: Satisfactory Transfer Procedures, but an
Anomalous Result
Justice Frye concurred with respect to the validity of the transfer stat-
utes, but dissented on the issue of whether Green's sentence was cruel
and unusual punishment.' Justice Frye recognized that almost two-
thirds of jurisdictions in the United States do not allow a life sentence for
sexual offenses."
In searching beyond whether the sentence was per se unconstitutional,
Justice Frye urged that the legislature could have neither foreseen, nor
intended to create, a five-month window during which a thirteen-year old
could receive a life sentence for a first-degree sexual offense.'" In addi-
tion, Justice Frye argued that this window was sufficiently "unusual" to
be in violation of article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion.' 97 He further expressed concern regarding the trial judge's inability
to exercise any discretion in sentencing Green because the sentence was
mandatory.'98 Lastly, although Justice Frye's opinion endorsed the trans-
fer statute, he chose not to join the majority because he felt that because
the legislature abolished the mandatory sentencing scheme for a first-
degree sexual offense, Green's sentence must have been "inconsistent
192. See id.
193. See id. at 833-34; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (illustrating the
growing trend of treating juveniles as adults).
194. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See id. at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. See id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the deci-
sion to reduce the minimum age of transfer and the decision to repeal the mandatory sen-
tencing scheme occurred at the same General Assembly session, yet both had different
dates of enactment thereby creating the five-month window).
197. See id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that al-
though sentencing guidelines are a legislative matter and courts should show deference,
the court has a duty to determine if the legislature acted with full knowledge and under-
standing of the consequences of their enactment's); see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 1013-14 (1983).
198. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 835 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"The judge could not consider or weigh any mitigating factors in determining whether a
sentence less than life imprisonment was the appropriate penalty." Id.
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with [the] State's own evolving standards of decency .... ,,"99
III. THE VALIDITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S TRANSFER STATUTE AND
ALTERING CRUEL OR UNUSUAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
Although the majority in Green correctly upheld the constitutional va-
lidity of North Carolina's transfer statute, the court should have invali-
dated Green's sentence because of its unusual nature.2°° The majority
declined to make a distinction between the words "cruel and unusual"
found in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the words "cruel or unusual" found in article I, section 27, of the North
Carolina Constitution. 1 Thus, the Green court ignored language ex-
pressly designed by the North Carolina legislature to provide greater
constitutional protections to its citizens.
22
A. North Carolina's Transfer Statute Comports with the Due Process
Clause
The Green court correctly held that the system of transfer in North
Carolina is constitutionally permissible and not in violation of the Due
Process Clause.0 By first analyzing the two-prong framework created in
Grayned and then recognizing that the Kent factors were not controlling,
the majority declared the transfer statute valid.2'
In analyzing the first prong of Grayned, the majority correctly deter-
mined that a person of ordinary intelligence would have recognized the
possibility that a juvenile court could transfer a youthful offender to
199. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (stating
that North Carolina's action of replacing the mandatory life sentence with the Structured
Sentencing Act speaks to the societal standards of decency and illustrates that Green's
sentence was improper).
200. See id. at 834-35 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring
with the majority concerning the due process protections accorded to juveniles who are
subject to transfer, but dissenting as to the sentence because he felt it was cruel or unusual
punishment under North Carolina law).
201. See id. at 828 (stating that North Carolina courts have always treated the Eighth
Amendment and article I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution as standing for
the same principles).
202. See id. at 835 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that
the North Carolina Constitution has, since 1868, prohibited cruel or unusual punishments,
and stating that it is clear that Green's sentence was unusual within the meaning of article
I, section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution); see also Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1014 (hold-
ing that states may provide greater constitutional protections than the minimal federal
standard found in the United States Constitution).
203. See Green, 502 S.E.2d. at 823-27 (holding that sections 7A-608 to 7A-610 of the
North Carolina Code were not unconstitutionally vague).
204. See id. at 823-24, 826-27.
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adult criminal court.2°5 The majority supports its position by pointing out
that the internal cross-references within the statutes, as well as the title of
the chapter in which they are found, clearly satisfy the first prong of the
vagueness standard.206
With regard to the second prong, which inquires into the guidance a
statute provides those who implement it, the court also properly did not
look at section 7A-610 of the North Carolina Code myopically, as Green
urged."7 Instead, the court chose to analyze that statute along with
North Carolina's Criminal Procedure Act and both Chapters 14 (Crimi-
nal Law) and 15A of the General Statutes, in an effort to illustrate that
the juvenile court judge has sufficient avenues to guide her decision to
transfer a youth to adult criminal court. 2°8 The court rightly concluded
that the statute is not vague because a judge makes a decision to transfer
only after she considers a number of factors, including the needs of the
juvenile and the interests of the state.2O
Lastly, the court appropriately rejected Green's argument that the
transfer statute was invalid because it did not mandate consideration of
the Kent factors.10 To justify this view, the majority pointed out that the
Kent Court did not make the factors a constitutional requirement. 21 ' Fur-
thermore, the Green court recognized that mandating the factors would
be unnecessary because juvenile court judges already considered most of
the factors when making a transfer decision.2 2
205. See id. at 825 (noting that sections 7A-608 to 7A-610 are found in Article 49 of
the Juvenile Code which is entitled, "Transfer to Superior Court").
206. See id.; see also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (providing the text of
sections 7A-608 and 7A-610 of the North Carolina Code).
207. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 825-26.
208. See id. at 825. "Hence, when a juvenile court judge seeks to determine whether
'the needs of the juvenile or the best interest of the State will be served by transfer,' in ac-
cord with section 7A-610(a), he or she does so within the structure of the entire criminal
justice system." Id.
209. See id. at 826-27 (explaining that if the judge decides that a transfer is valid, she
does so with full knowledge of her alternatives in both justice systems). In addition, some
other factors she may consider are the seriousness of the crime, the juvenile's chance of
rehabilitation, family life, and the ideals of society concerning the disposition of juvenile
offenders. See id.
210. See id. at 827; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (listing
the applicable factors).
211. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827. See generally Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
212. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 827. Compare id. (enumerating the factors the juvenile
court judge in Green considered), with Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67 (listing the factors).
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B. Altering Cruel or Unusual Jurisprudence in North Carolina
Although the Green court correctly upheld North Carolina's system of
transfer, the court erred when it failed to recognize that Andre Green's
sentence was cruel or unusual punishment.213 The court recognized that a
state sovereign may alter the constitutional rights of its citizens, but only
if the alteration provides more rather than less protection."4 The North
Carolina Constitution exemplifies this principle, as it creates a more
broad protection against excessive punishment by including the disjunc-
tive "or" in article I, section 27, as opposed to the conjunctive "and"
found in the Federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment."5
When the court addressed Green's "unusual" punishment argument
with respect to article I, section 27, though, it determined that stare deci-
sis principles forbade it from treating the United States Constitution and
the North Carolina Constitution differently.216 This determination was
unfounded, however, because an analysis of the cases cited by the ma-
jority reveals that none of them directly discuss the dichotomy between.. • 21721
the two constitutions. In fact, only State v. Fulcher218 mentions the
words "cruel or unusual punishment" found in article I, section 27, of the
213. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834-35 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
214. See id. at 828 (providing the distinction between article I, section 27 of the North
Carolina Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Amicus Cu-
riae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation in
Support of Appellant at 22, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96)
(noting the origins of article I, section 27, of the North Carolina Constitution and stating
that legislative history "highlight the fact that North Carolina's prohibition against certain
punishments is broader than its federal counterpart"); see also California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983).
215. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (comparing the differences between the
punishment provisions in the Federal and North Carolina Constitutions); see also Amicus
Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation
in Support of Appellant at 21, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96)
(noting that the use of the word "or" represents a "significant departure" by North Caro-
lina from the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution).
216. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 828 (citing State v. Bronson, 423 S.E.2d 772, 780 (N.C.
1992); State v. Rogers, 374 S.E.2d 852, 858 (N.C. 1989); State v. Peek, 328 S.E.2d 249, 256
(N.C. 1985); State v. Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (N.C. 1985); and State v. Fulcher,
243 S.E.2d 338, 352 (N.C. 1978) as the line of cases supporting the majority's contention
that the court has historically treated cruel and/or unusual punishment claims the same
under both the Federal and North Carolina Constitutions).
217. See id. at 828. The Green majority relied on: State v. Bronson, 423 S.E.2d 772, 780
(N.C. 1992); State v. Rogers, 374 S.E.2d 852, 858 (N.C. 1989); State v. Peek, 328 S.E.2d 249,
256 (N.C. 1985); State v. Higginbottom, 324 S.E.2d 834, 837 (N.C. 1985); and State v. Ful-
cher, 243 S.E.2d 338, 352 (N.C. 1978).
218. 243 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. 1978).
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North Carolina Constitution. 9
Moreover, the majority cites Trop v. Dulles for the proposition that the
United States Supreme Court does not recognize a difference between
the words "cruel" and "unusual."22' Specifically, the Trop Court held
that, "[w]hether the word 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different
from [the word] 'cruel' is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has
had to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between
cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn."22' The Green
majority misapplied this holding because first, Trop was referring to the
language found in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and not the more broad article I, section 27 language, and second,
the Trop court did not take a definitive stance on the issue. 22 Instead,
the Trop majority explained that few precedents existed on the issue, but
those that did exist appeared not to create a distinction between the
words "cruel" and "unusual. 2 23 It is apparent, therefore, that the Green
court should have recognized the difference in the words of the two con-
stitutions, and, moreover, should have determined whether or not Andre
Green's punishment was cruel or unusual punishment. 4 If the majority
conducted this analysis, it would have been clear that Andre Green's
punishment was "unusual," and therefore unconstitutional.2 1 When the
General Assembly lowered the minimum age of transfer and abolished
the mandatory life sentence for a first-degree sexual offense, it created
an idiosyncratic five-month window into which only Andre Green fell.2 '
219. See id. at 352 (emphasis added).
220. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 828; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 n.32
(1958).
221. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32.
222. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983) (holding that the
states may create broader provisions in their respective criminal justice systems than the
Federal Constitution provides); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32.
223. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-101 & n.32.
224. See Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834-35 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
225. See id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. See supra note 34 and its accompanying text (explaining the background of the
two pieces of legislation); see also Green, 502 S.E.2d at 834 (Frye, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that there are 31 jurisdictions that do not permit a life sen-
tence for sexual offense, and only two other states, Arizona and Iowa, provide mandatory
life sentences for sexual offenses). Moreover, Arizona is the only state that creates the
possibility that a 13-year old juvenile could be subjected to the mandatory life sentence for
first-degree sexual offense. See id. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105(V)(A) (1998)
(first-degree sexual offense is a Class 2 felony, pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
3-402 (1998), and carries a minimum sentence of 8 years in prison and maximum of 24
years in prison), and GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (1999) (anyone who commits rape is subject
to a death sentence, life imprisonment, or imprisonment between 10 and 20 years), and
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Justice Frye's partial dissent is constitutionally correct in urging that the
sentence be set aside because of the "unusual" circumstances involving
the creation of the five-month window.
IV. CONCLUSION
In relying on the void for vagueness doctrine, the Green majority ap-
propriately recognized the constitutional validity of North Carolina's
transfer statute. The majority recognized the recent public outcry con-
cerning juvenile crime and affirmed the judgment of the legislature by
upholding the validity of the statute. By disregarding the language of
North Carolina's equivalent of the Eighth Amendment, however, the
Green majority ignored the will of the people as expressed by the North
Carolina General Assembly. The majority refused to apply the law as
the legislature wrote it, and Andre Green was an unfortunate victim of
the misgivings of the North Carolina Supreme Court. The majority
failed to recognize that the United States Constitution creates the mini-
mal standard of protection a state must provide its citizens, and that a
state is free to create broader provisions in its constitution. By over-
looking the language of North Carolina's equivalent of the Eighth
Amendment, the Green court effectively rendered the legislature's
broader provision meaningless.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 253, 1252 (West Supp. 1998) (classifying gross sexual
conduct as a Class A felony subject to a prison term not to exceed 40 years), and MIss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-71 (1999):
Every person who shall be convicted of an assault with intent to forcibly ravish
any female of previous chaste character shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for life, or for such shorter time as may be fixed by the jury, or by
the court upon the entry of a plea of guilty,
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (1997) (under the structured sentencing system, the
maximum sentence Green would have received could have been 20 years of imprisonment
for the crime of first degree sexual offense, while the minimum sentence he could have
received would have been 12 years in prison), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3253(b)
(Supp. 1998) (stating that a person who commits aggravated sexual assault faces a maxi-
mum sentence of life imprisonment).
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